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ABSTRACT 
The importance of aeronautical decision making (ADM) has been considered one of 
the most critical issues of flight education for future professional pilots. Researchers 
have suggested that a safety information system based on information from incidents 
and near misses is an important tool to improve the intelligence and readiness of 
pilots. This paper describes a study that examines the effect of safety information on 
aeronautical decision making for students in a collegiate flight program. Data was 
collected from study participants who were exposed to periodic information about 
local aircraft malfunctions. Participants were then evaluated using a flight simulator 
profile and a pen and pencil test of situational judgment. Findings suggest that 
regular access to the described safety information program significantly improves 
decision making of student pilots. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Sound pilot decision making is essential to the safe completion of 
every flight. O’Hare (2003) indicates that “It is difficult to think of any 
single topic that is more central to the question of effective human 
performance in aviation than that of decision making” (p. 230). The term 
aeronautical decision making (ADM) has been used to describe and assess 
pilot judgment within many aviation circles (Jensen, 1997) Paradoxically, 
aeronautical decision making, so crucial to the safety of flight, often receives 
scant emphasis in pilot training. Richard Jensen, the General Chair of the 
Ninth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, commented, 
“Unfortunately, most student pilots do not receive structured decision 
making or judgment training either in their initial or later flying 
experience…[and]…How can we expect them to reach above the level of 
competence if we do not teach judgment?” (Jensen, 1997, p. iv). Jensen 
suggests that training in aeronautical decision making/judgment can take the 
form of reading case studies about accidents and incidents as well as 
studying the experiences of other pilots in abnormal situations.  
Eiff (1999) suggests that the state of intelligent and respectful 
wariness can foster a heightened state of vigilance for error potentials and 
dedication to performing safe acts. In addition, Reason (1997) notes that: 
  
In the absence of bad outcomes, the best way—perhaps the only way—
to sustain a state of intelligent and respectful wariness is to gather the 
right kinds of data. This means creating a safety information system 
that collects, analyzes and disseminates information from incidents and 
near misses as well as from regular proactive checks on the system’s 
vital signs. (p. 195)  
 
Many safety information systems in aviation have been developed 
around the world, including the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) 
developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 
the Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting Programme (CHIRP) 
used in the United Kingdom, and the British Airways Safety Information 
System (BASIS). Three years ago, Purdue University researchers created a 
safety information system entitled the Aircraft Discrepancy Analysis Metrics 
(ADAM). Dillman, Lee, and Petrin (2003) have reported on detailed features 
of ADAM and its utilization. ADAM was originally designed to gather, 
track, and analyze aircraft discrepancies as a tool for aircraft safety 
management. It has been used to compile five years of information on 
mechanical discrepancies for all Purdue aircraft. The description of every 
aircraft discrepancy written in each logbook has been analyzed and 
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categorized into a unified metric format. However, most Purdue aviation 
students are unaware of ADAM because its main application has been at the 
resource management level.  
The content and structure of initial flight education, as in other fields of 
education, are extremely important. Jensen (1997) feels that “initial training 
can have an effect on certain aspects of flying that may carry throughout 
one’s career” (p. v). Clearly, initial training in a collegiate flight program is 
one of the most defining stages for future professional pilots. It is imperative 
that students acquire sound decision making strategies from the very 
beginning as this skill forms the basis for an approach to safety decisions 
throughout their entire professional career. Since most flight education 
employs little structured judgment training, a safety information system 
would appear to be a valuable instrument for enhancing desired student 
aeronautical decision making.  
The purpose of this study was to assess whether a safety information 
system could effectively improve aeronautical decision making for students 
in a collegiate flight program. Three theories support the potential benefits of 
safety information to flight students’ decision making: the Detailed 
Judgment Model (Jensen, Adrion, Maresh, & Weinert, 1987), Naturalistic 
Decision Making Theory (Lipshitz, 1993; Orasanu & Connolly, 1993; 
Thargard, 1988), and the Learning Framework (Gredler, 2001).  
Jensen, Adrion, Maresh, and Weinert (1987) use their Detailed 
Judgment Model to explain that aeronautical decisions are made with 
rational and motivational judgments. A safety information system is thought 
to be beneficial for rational judgment. While motivational judgment deals 
with personal motivation to execute a suitable course of action, rational 
judgment follows five sequentially connected steps: problem vigilance, 
problem recognition, problem diagnosis, alternative identification, and risk 
analysis. For these steps of rational judgment, a good source of information 
will help pilot vigilance. Pilots generally use the simplest or most 
economical interpretation of a stimulus to arrive at the interpretation most 
likely to match the source of stimulation during problem recognition. 
Problem diagnosis requires an understanding of prior probabilities for certain 
events, and comes into significant play when there may be a mechanical 
problem with the aircraft. The stage of rational judgment where alternatives 
are identified requires creativity and knowledge of the aircraft. Risk analysis 
requires computational approximation skills and knowledge of the relative 
safety in different courses of action (Jensen, 1995).  
Naturalistic Decision Making Theory advocates support the beneficial 
effect of a safety information system. Lipshitz (1993) says that experts in 
naturalistic decision making tend to generate a single course of action as the 
best choice. Based on the classification of the problem, decision makers 
provide a single highly likely option and evaluate its appropriateness to the 
6 Journal of Air Transportation  
 
 
current conditions. Orasanu and Connolly (1993) also say that decision 
makers use their knowledge to organize the problem, to interpret the 
situation, and to define what information is needed to arrive at a solution. 
This process allows the decision maker to make a speedy assessment, search, 
selection, and interpretation of relevant information.  
Finally, the Learning Framework reported by Gredler (2001) depicts the 
potentially beneficial effect of a safety information system to flight students. 
The learning framework consists of the learner’s prior knowledge and 
organization of the information (encoding) to be learned. The learner’s prior 
knowledge serves to identify incoming information and also influences the 
inferences made by the learner about new information. Encoding is the 
process that prepares selected information for storage in long-term memory 
and later recall. Encoding requires the construction of meaningful links 
between the new concepts or ideas and the learner’s prior knowledge. The 
higher cognitive functions are characterized by conscious awareness of the 
encoding process and permit the individual to make use of logical 
relationships and generalizations (Gredler, 2001). 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This study considered the hypothesis that a safety information system 
such as ADAM would have a beneficial effect on student pilots’ aeronautical 
decision making in critical flight safety situations. The following research 
questions were developed to direct the study.   
1. Is the recognition time for abnormal aircraft conditions shorter 
for flight students exposed to periodic review of ADAM than for 
non-exposed students? 
2. Is the response time for abnormal aircraft conditions shorter for 
flight students exposed to periodic review of ADAM than for non-
exposed students? 
3. Do the flight students who periodically review ADAM follow 
more appropriate procedures to resolve an abnormal aircraft 
condition than those who do not? 
METHODOLOGY 
Participants 
Volunteers were recruited from a population of students who were in 
their second to fourth semesters of a baccalaureate degree program, had 
received their private pilot certificate, and were training for a commercial 
pilot certificate. Study participants were randomly selected from the 
volunteer pool and randomly assigned to equally sized experiment and 
control groups. Based on a statistical power analysis, forty volunteers were 
initially assigned to the study. However, six individuals later discontinued 
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their participation and were dropped from the study. As a result, study 
findings are based on data collected from 34 participants (17 in each group).   
 
Research Design 
 The study treatment consisted of measured access to current ADAM 
information. This access was through the university’s online teaching 
structure using WebCT Vista. Each flight student in the experimental group 
was provided WebCT access to the ADAM database throughout the duration 
of the study. These students were directed to review ADAM prior to each 
flight and specifically focus on the discrepancy history of the aircraft that 
they would be flying. Furthermore, periodic reminders and announcements 
were posted online that directed students to be wary and focus on particular 
systems failures. This treatment was provided to the experiment group eight 
times over a five-week period and included information on aircraft system 
malfunctions. In addition, the control and experiment groups both completed 
a pre- and post-treatment pencil and paper test of decision making skills and 
a short simulator profile flight. The ADAM treatment was the independent 
variable for this study and the dependent variable was flight student 
judgment during critical flight safety situations, measured in terms of 
recognition time, response time, and appropriate actions. The ADAM 
treatment was postulated to positively influence flight student decision 
making.  
 
Instrumentation 
To answer the research questions in this study, two types of instruments 
were used, the Situational Judgment Test (SJT) and a Frasca 141 profile 
flight. The SJT is a paper and pencil type instrument developed by the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to assess general aviation pilots’ 
decision making skills. Hunter (2003) advises, “the SJT has potential for use 
in the assessment of judgment or aeronautical decision making by general 
aviation (GA) pilots, and might be useful in the evaluation of training” (p. 
373). The SJT is used to evaluate differences between solutions 
recommended by an FAA-designated panel of subject matter experts and 
judgment/decisions made by general aviation pilots (Hunter, 2003).  
A Frasca 141 flight-training device (FTD) was used to measure study 
participants’ decision processes during abnormal flight conditions. A 
detailed FTD test plan was developed under the supervision and guidance of 
a local panel of flight experts. This five-member panel was composed of 
FAA-designated flight examiners, flight instructors, and professional 
aviation maintenance technicians. The panel’s advice concerning the 
technical and mechanical issues of aircraft and simulator operation were 
pivotal in the planning of the test events. Activity in the FTD included a 
preflight briefing and a flight profile with periodic malfunction trigger 
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events. Participant activity in response to the malfunctions was recorded on 
an assessment form.  
Three variables were measured during the FTD flight: recognition time, 
response time, and appropriateness of response to the trigger events. 
Recognition time was measured from the introduction of a simulated aircraft 
system malfunction (trigger event) until the participant recognized the 
situation. The indications of recognition were either the participant’s verbal 
expression or physical action of recognition, such as pointing out the 
appropriate aircraft performance indicator or initiation of corrective action 
(e.g., turning off an alternator switch for alternator failure). Maximum 
waiting time until a participant recognized the event was planned as 300 
seconds (five minutes). If a participant did not recognize the event within the 
time line, the participant’s recognition time was recorded as 300 seconds.  
Response time was measured from recognition of a simulated abnormal 
aircraft condition (trigger event) until the participant completed the 
corrective actions. If a participant did not initiate any corrective action until 
after 300 seconds (five minutes), the response time was reported as 300 
seconds.  
Appropriateness of response to an abnormal aircraft condition was 
measured by analyzing the participant’s sequence of corrective actions. 
These corrective actions were compared with recommended procedures in 
the Piper Warrior III pilot’s operating handbook and the FAA-approved 
airplane flight manual (Piper Warrior, 1995). In measuring corrective 
actions, two considerations were applied: did the corrective actions include 
all steps from the recommended procedure, and were the corrective actions 
completed in the recommended sequence. These measurements were 
recorded with numeric scores on an assessment form. 
 Trigger events for the FTD profile were selected after consideration of 
guidelines provided by the flight expert panel. Only trigger events that could 
be initiated from the simulator instructor’s control console were used. Profile 
standardization could only be assured if the timing for a trigger event, the 
control of the trigger event, aircraft position in the profile, and flight altitude 
were controlled in a consistent manner from the control console. In addition, 
trigger events should produce an immediate instrument or warning light 
indication when initiated. Recognition time for each trigger event was based 
on a video record that captured the elapsed time from when a trigger event 
was initiated until the participant recognized the event, as evidenced by an 
auditory cue or observable action. Therefore, immediate instrument or 
warning light indication was essential in order to have a starting point for 
measuring those times. Finally, each trigger event should have only one 
appropriate corrective action as specified by the Piper Warrior III pilot’s 
operating handbook and the FAA-approved airplane flight manual (1995). 
Corrective actions to each trigger event were measured by counting 
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deviations from the recommended corrective action, missed steps in the 
procedure, and actions not completed in the recommended sequence by a 
participant. Using these guidelines, four trigger events were eventually 
selected for use during the FTD profile: alternator failure, high oil pressure, 
high load meter, and vacuum pump system failure.  
A flight profile was developed to set uniform flight parameters for each 
participant. The flight profile was divided into four legs and each leg 
included one trigger event. During the flight profile, participants were asked 
to make periodic heading or altitude changes to make the flying condition 
more realistic and reduce the anticipation of trigger events. To minimize 
possible threats to internal validity caused by participant interaction with the 
FTD, the flight profile was only completed posttest (after the treatment). The 
SJT was completed pre- and posttest. Measurements for each test are 
summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1. Study measurements 
 
Since the Frasca 141 FTD cockpit display has no circuit breakers, unlike 
a real aircraft, a simulated circuit breaker panel was made and affixed to the 
instrument panel of the simulator to facilitate completion of required 
corrective actions. In addition, the front monitor screen of the simulator was 
set to represent Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) for participant 
reference. All flight performance was videotaped to capture data for later 
analysis. Data acquired with the SJT and Frasca 141 FTD was reviewed and 
analyzed using the SAS System for Windows (SAS Institute, 2004). 
RESULTS 
The SJT instrument is structured in a multiple-choice format with four 
alternative choices to each question. The answer choices for each SJT 
question were ranked from most correct to least correct by FAA-designated 
subject matter experts. Participants who took the SJT were asked to select 
Pretest Posttest Instrument 
Experiment 
Group 
Control  
Group 
Experiment 
Group 
Control 
Group 
Measurement 
Frasca 141 
FTD 
N/A N/A Yes Yes Recognition  
Time 
Frasca 141 
FTD 
N/A N/A Yes Yes Response 
Time 
Frasca 141 
FTD 
N/A N/A Yes Yes Appropriateness 
of Response 
SJT Yes Yes Yes Yes Adherence to 
Recommended 
Solution 
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their best choice among the four possible answers to each question. 
Adherence of participant’s decision to the recommended solution was 
measured by comparing how close the participant’s choice was to the most 
correct answer recommended by the expert panel. An Analysis of 
Covariance (ANCOVA) analysis with the posttest SJT as the response 
variable and the pretest SJT as the covariate was applied to the data. The 
results of this test indicated a statistically significant difference between the 
control group and the experimental group for posttest SJT scores (F = 36.40, 
p < 0.0001), which suggests the positive effect of an ADAM treatment.  
The difference between posttest and pretest SJT scores within the 
experimental group was analyzed with a regression model. This analysis 
examined the level of procedural accuracy before and after treatment. The 
regression analysis indicated that the posttest SJT result of the experimental 
group was significantly different from their pretest SJT result (t = 4.71, p = 
0.0003). Again, this suggests the positive effect of an ADAM treatment. 
Appropriateness of response to an abnormal aircraft condition was 
measured by analyzing the participant’s corrective action to resolve the 
abnormal condition during the Frasca 141 simulator flight test. The 
participant’s corrective actions were compared with the recommended 
procedures in the Piper Warrior pilot’s operating handbook and the FAA-
approved airplane flight manual (1995), and were recorded with numeric 
scores on a corrective action assessment form. A two-way Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) model with group and experience level as the main 
factors was used to analyze the difference of corrective action scores. The 
analysis indicated that the corrective action scores of the experiment and 
control groups were significantly different (F = 25.63, p < .0001). 
Recognition time for this study was measured from initiation of a trigger 
event until participant recognition of the event. If a participant did not 
recognize a trigger event after five minutes (300 seconds), their recognition 
time was reported as 300 seconds. Recognition times from this study were 
not normally distributed. Since non-normality violates one of the 
assumptions for parametric statistical models, ANOVA or regression models 
could not be considered appropriate for the analysis of recognition times. In 
this situation, a non-parametric statistical test can be used. One of the most 
frequently used non-parametric statistical tests is the Kruskal-Wallis Test 
(Hollander & Wolfe, 1999), and the results for this study are reported in 
Table 2. 
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Table 2. Kruskal-Wallis test results for recognition time analysis between groups 
Trigger Event DF Chi-Square Pr > Chi-Square 
1 1 2.5546 0.1100 
2 1 9.5237 0.0020* 
3 1 2.0334 0.1539 
4 1 4.4361 0.0352* 
All 1 14.4857 0.0001* 
Note.α  =. 05 
 
Results from the Kruskal-Wallis Tests suggest that recognition times for 
trigger events 1 and 3 were not significantly different between the 
experimental and control groups. However, the recognition times for trigger 
events 2 and 4 were significantly different. Finally, the overall recognition 
time, which was the summed recognition times of trigger events 1, 2, 3, and 
4, was significantly different between the experimental and control groups. 
These results suggest that flight students exposed to periodic review of 
ADAM had shorter recognition times for abnormal aircraft conditions than 
non-exposed students.  
Response time for this study was measured from participant recognition 
of a simulated abnormal aircraft condition (trigger event) until the participant 
finished the corrective actions. If a participant made no corrective action 
after five minutes had elapsed (300 seconds), the response time was reported 
as 300 seconds. If a participant made corrective actions but none of the steps 
were correct, the response time was also reported as 300 seconds. Five 
participants (one in the experimental group and four in the control group) 
made corrective actions to trigger event 3, but none of their actions were 
correct. If a participant took corrective actions but the actions had a missed 
step, the ending point of the response time was recorded when the last 
correct action was made. Nine participants (four in the experiment group and 
five in the control group) made corrective actions with a missed action step 
in response to trigger event 1. Five participants (four in the experimental 
group and one in the control group) made corrective actions with a missed 
action step in response to trigger event 3. The response time data were found 
not normally distributed, similar to those seen in the recognition time data. 
Thus, the same methods used in recognition time analyses, the Kruskal-
Wallis Tests, were implemented in response time analyses as reported in 
Table 3. 
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Table 3. Kruskal-Wallis test results for response time analysis between groups 
Trigger Event DF Chi-Square Pr > Chi-Square 
1 1 6.1305 0.0133* 
2 1 11.7060 0.0006* 
3 1 17.2231 <. 0001* 
4 1 1.7178 0.1900 
All 1 22.1079 <. 0001* 
Note. α  = .05 
  
The Kruskal-Wallis Test results suggest that response times to trigger 
events 1, 2, and 3 were significantly different between the experimental and 
control groups. However, the response time to trigger event 4 was not 
significantly different. Finally, the overall response time, which is the 
summed response time to trigger events 1, 2, 3, and 4, was significantly 
different between the experimental and control groups. These results suggest 
that the flight students exposed to periodic review of ADAM information 
completed corrective actions to abnormal aircraft conditions in less time than 
did non-exposed students. Study findings suggest the following answers to 
the research questions: 
1. Flight students exposed to periodic review of ADAM had shorter 
recognition times to the trigger events of high oil pressure and 
vacuum pump system failure than non-exposed students but not to 
the trigger events of alternator failure and high electrical load. The 
overall recognition time during abnormal aircraft conditions for 
flight students exposed to periodic review of ADAM was shorter 
than the overall recognition time of non-exposed students.  
2. Flight students exposed to periodic review of ADAM had shorter 
response times to the   trigger events of alternator failure, high oil 
pressure, and high electrical load than non-exposed students but not 
to vacuum pump system failure. The overall response time during 
abnormal aircraft conditions for flight students exposed to periodic 
review of ADAM was shorter than the overall response time of non-
exposed students. 
3. Flight students who periodically review ADAM took corrective 
action closer to the recommended solutions than those who did not.  
DISCUSSION 
Jensen (1995) says that people learn to expect certain things to happen 
from their awareness of predictable elements developed during situational 
experiences. Barber (1999) mentions situation awareness as anticipating and 
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considering future situations by monitoring, assessing, and evaluating the 
current situation. Barber also suggests that situation awareness is essential 
for the initial stages of problem detection, with information gathering and 
summarization providing the necessary tools for understanding a more 
complex situation that may not be straightforward or which may not have 
been previously experienced. The outcomes from this study support Barber’s 
work. Study participants who periodically reviewed safety information 
demonstrated enhanced situational awareness and recognized abnormal 
aircraft conditions sooner than the students who did not. Also, the corrective 
actions made by flight students who periodically reviewed this safety 
information were more appropriate than those made by the students who did 
not. Finally, the SJT results indicated that flight students who periodically 
reviewed safety information made more appropriate decisions to abnormal 
flight conditions that they had not previously experienced (many of the 
scenarios described in SJT were not cases that the study participants would 
normally encounter in a collegiate flight environment). 
 Hart (1988) notes that recognition and interpretation of incoming 
sensory information requires transformation based on expectations, 
information processing, previous experience, and knowledge of the current 
situation. In addition, Boff, Kaufman, and Thomas (1986) suggest that 
perception is the process by which particular relationships among potentially 
separate stimulus elements are determined and in turn guide the 
interpretation of those elements. The findings of this study indicate that 
flight students who periodically reviewed safety information recognized 
abnormal aircraft conditions in shorter time than the students who did not. 
Also, the corrective actions for abnormal aircraft conditions, made by the 
flight students who periodically reviewed the safety information, were more 
appropriate than the corrective actions made by the students who did not. 
These results suggest that regular access to safety information enhances 
flight students’ recognition of abnormal aircraft conditions.  
Orasanu and Connolly (1993), advocates of naturalistic decision 
making, say that decision makers use their knowledge to organize a problem, 
interpret the situation, and define what information is needed to formulate a 
solution. This process helps the decision maker complete a speedy 
assessment by searching, selecting, and interpreting relevant information. 
One of the findings of this study (recognition time) is that flight students 
who periodically review safety information make faster assessments of 
abnormal aircraft conditions than those who do not. The study findings also 
suggest that flight students who periodically review safety information make 
a more accurate interpretation of relevant information and are more likely to 
select correct actions.  
Ritchie (1988) reports that, depending upon the nature of the display and 
the pilot’s ability to use it, the pilot may be able to process visually provided 
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information at prodigious rates. One of the study finding areas, recognition 
time, supports this conclusion. The first trigger event of alternator failure 
during the Frasca 141 simulator flight tests had two types of indicators 
displaying the system failure: alternator failure warning light and ammeter. 
The other trigger events did not have system failure warning lights. The 
research findings show that the recognition time for the trigger event of 
alternator failure was much shorter (mean 11.17 seconds) than the 
recognition times for other trigger events (high oil pressure: mean 108.50 
seconds; high load meter: mean 98.71 seconds; vacuum pump failure: mean 
29.12 seconds). This result suggests the relative importance of a warning 
light in detecting system failures. 
Inagaki, Takae, and Moray (1999) assert that a large number of flying 
hours do not define an expert, unless those hours include a variety of normal 
and abnormal experiences which lead to better judgment. In this study, 
participants were assigned to one of the three experience levels based on 
their flight education progress. Participants’ total flight experience ranged 
from about 82 hours to 208 hours (at the beginning of this study), and each 
experience level had a range of about 50 to 70 hours total flight time. Study 
results suggest that there was no apparent significant impact of experience 
level on participant performance across all four areas that were monitored 
(adherence to a recommended solution, recognition time of an abnormal 
aircraft condition, appropriateness of response, and response time). This 
supports the notion that participants’ experience levels were not greatly 
varied for this study.  
Finally, flight simulator results for trigger event 4 (vacuum pump 
failure) did not demonstrate significant difference in response time between 
the experimental and control groups. The nature of the simulated failure 
could provide a possible explanation for this lack of difference between the 
groups. The vacuum system of an aircraft provides pneumatic power to 
several of the primary flight instruments. One of these instruments is the 
attitude indicator which provides the pilot with a primary reference for pitch 
and roll movements. The failure of the vacuum system is primarily indicated 
through a vacuum gage on the instrument panel but might also be recognized 
by the erratic performance of the attitude indicator. Once the vacuum pump 
was failed in the simulation, the vacuum pressure indication on the gage 
dropped immediately to zero. This was followed by the attitude indicator 
slowly becoming erratic, a condition that would be quickly noticed by the 
pilot. Thus, the participants from either the experimental group or control 
group who did not recognize the dropped in vacuum pressure indication 
might recognize the vacuum pump failure from the erratic attitude indicator 
display. Once they recognized the vacuum pump failure, the only possible 
step for the corrective action was to turn on the electrical vacuum pump 
switch. The lack of notable difference between the experimental and control 
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group responses may be attributable to the fact that more than one indicator 
of vacuum failure existed providing enhanced opportunity for identification 
of the problem. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study has investigated whether safety information has a beneficial 
effect on aeronautical decision making for students in a collegiate flight 
program. Researchers monitored a group of flight students who periodically 
reviewed ADAM (safety information) and a group of flight students who did 
not. The data collected included participant responses in terms of: (a) 
adherence to a recommended solution, (b) recognition time of an abnormal 
aircraft condition, (c) appropriateness of response, and (d) response time. 
Research findings suggest that flight students who periodically reviewed 
ADAM completed more timely and effective responses to the four 
malfunction areas monitored during the study. Study participants who 
periodically reviewed ADAM also made decisions and took actions that 
were closer to the solutions recommended by aviation experts than students 
who did not have access to ADAM.  
Study findings suggest that flight students who periodically reviewed 
safety information demonstrated an improved capacity for aeronautical 
decision making ability in comparison to those who did not. Although any 
generalization of these findings to all pilot trainee populations may be 
premature, they do represent an important area for further investigation. A 
safety information system similar to the one used during this study may not 
only assist in tracking of aircraft discrepancies for maintenance purposes, but 
also provide a valuable enhancement to pilot decision making for all flight 
training programs. 
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